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The COVID-19 pandemic has caused nontrivial disruptions to global value 
chains and affected the lives of many people, particularly the poor across the 
world. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in the early part of 2020 in 
Africa, happened during a time that African countries had just signed one of the 
world’s largest trade agreements and therefore began introducing continental-level 
structures to strengthen free trade among member states. This chapter examines the 
potential effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the agenda for free trade in Africa, 
both in the short and in the long-term. Specifically, the chapter explores the trading 
environment of firms in Africa and highlights generally the challenges faced when 
implementing a trade agreement in the middle of a pandemic. It also, on the other 
hand, highlights how trade agreement in a middle of a pandemic can be a good 
thing to minimize the effect of the pandemic on poor and vulnerable households 
in Africa. The chapter ends by highlighting the need for managing the COVID-19 
pandemic to grow and sustain intra-African trade.
Keywords: Trade, Africa, African Continental Free Trade Area, COVID-19, SDGs
1. Introduction
Africa’s most ambitious trade initiative, the African Continental Free Trade 
Area (AfCFTA) agreement, was signed and launched at the African Union (AU) 
Assembly on 21 March, 2018 in Kigali, with the agreement fully coming into force 
on 30 May, 2019. Out of the 55 member states, 34 countries have both signed and 
deposited their instruments of AfCFTA ratification. However, due to the political 
situation in Eritrea, the country has yet to join the agreement.
The AfCFTA agenda is to boost intra-African trade by around 60% by 2022. The 
agreement was necessitated by the low level of intra-African trade before the sign-
ing of the agreement. Data from the African Development Bank (AfDB) showed 
for example that trade among African countries was about 10% in 2000. Fourteen 
(14) years afterward, in 2014, and prior to the signing of the AfCFTA agreement, 
even though intra-African trade had increased, the continent recorded barely a 6% 
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increase in intra-Africa trade, over the 2000 base level [1]. Thus, despite the inten-
sification of bilateral intra-African trade agreements over the past two decades, 
still, only 16% of international trade by African countries took place within Africa 
in 2014.
A number of empirical and anecdotal evidence have shown the importance of 
intra-regional trade on poverty reduction. For example, regional organizations’ 
are better positioned to link regional trade to region-wide health, education, social 
protection, and other public goods policies, and therefore provide a platform 
to strengthen global, regional, and national actions on poverty reduction [2]. A 
number of researchers have emphasized the intra-regional trade, employment/
income linkages [3–5], whereas others emphasized the intra-regional trade and 
investment linkages [6–8], and how these linkages do impact poverty at national 
and regional levels. Das [9] argues that the linkages need to be analytically 
understood and empirically examined to make regional cooperation initiatives 
development-oriented.
Nudging free trade by eliminating bottlenecks associated with intra-regional 
trade can be pivotal towards addressing poverty and food insecurity in many parts 
of Africa (see [10]). Others argue that the advantage of intra-African trade is not 
solely in the production and trade of raw food products and thereby reducing 
food insecurity, but also countries with more advanced manufacturing sectors 
hold potential for Africa’s growth, and a reduction in imports if such countries in 
Africa can access the larger African market (see [1]). However, despite the need for 
stronger economic cooperation in developing countries, Das [9] intimate that there 
are very few regional economic integrations in the developing world, with many 
successful economic groupings found in the developed world.
For example, despite the potential effect of economic integration, evidence 
from ASEAN countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand have shown the limited effect of small level integration schemes on trade. 
Specifically, Sharma and Chua [11], for example, found that the ASEAN integration 
scheme did not increase intra-ASEAN trade, but an increase in trade occurred with 
members of a wider Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group. Kweka and 
Mboya [12] found that regional integration with the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and East African Community (EAC) led to increased trade 
and employment within the region. Evidence from the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) which adopted its ‘West African Common Industry 
Policy’ in 2010 saw an increase in intra-regional trade and increased creation of 
high-quality jobs but faced high trade cost which prevented less productive firms 
from entering the regional market (see [5] for more details). For the countries of 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the Arab- Maghreb Union (AMU), 
the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) which was meant to increase trade 
between MENA countries and that of other Arab countries was initially limited to 
goods liberalization and did not include trade facilitation among its provisions, and 
therefore had little impact on regional trade due to restrictive non-tariff measures 
and inefficient cross-border measures (see [13, 14]). However, full trade liberaliza-
tion in the GAFTA led to a significant increase in intra-regional exports, particu-
larly for the Maghreb sub-region, where export growth reaches around 6% [13].
The African continent is made up of 55 countries and if all countries would 
negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with all other African countries, there would 
be 1,485 bilateral FTAs (55 x 54 divided by 2) [15]. A number of authors have 
argued that the multiple memberships of numerous regional economic communi-
ties (RECs) have seemingly contributed to the slow progress of inter-regional 
integration on the African continent [16, 17]. Thus, even though there are benefits 
to sub-regional bloc integration i.e., ECOWAS, EAC, SADC, and AMU, a universal 
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trade bloc that encompasses all the sub-regional blocs would have a much better 
potential to increase trade, and as such stand a chance of making a significant 
push towards reducing the severity of poverty in Africa. It is in this spirit, that the 
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was mooted and signed by many 
African countries across the various traditional economic blocs.
This chapter discusses the short and long-run effects of the COVID-19 related 
shocks on the success or otherwise of the African Continental Free Trade Area 
(AfCFTA) agreement, and how such outcomes can impact the welfare of the poor. 
The discussion also explores the channels through which the COVID-19 shocks 
are transmitted, namely through consumption, production, and market-based 
labor activities.
2. Background and structure of the AfCFTA agreement
After decades of emphasis on sub-regional trade blocs in Africa, the African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement was finally signed and launched 
in 2018. The key objective of this agreement is to create a single African continental 
market for goods and services, with free movement of business persons and 
investments, and thus pave the way for accelerating the establishment of the 
Customs Union. As an auxiliary but important objective, the agreement also hopes 
to boost Africa’s trading position in the global market by strengthening Africa’s 
common voice and policy space in global trade negotiations. The specific objectives 
of the AfCFTA are:
a. progressively eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods;
b. progressively liberalize trade in services;
c. cooperate on investment, intellectual property rights and competition policy;
d. cooperate on all trade-related areas;
e. cooperate on customs matters and the implementation of trade facilitation 
measures;
f. establish a mechanism for the settlement of disputes concerning their rights 
and obligations; and
g. establish and maintain an institutional framework for the implementation and 
administration of the AfCFTA.
The AfCFTA is governed by five (5) operational instruments, namely, rules of 
origin; the online negotiating forum; the monitoring and elimination of non-tariff 
barriers; a digital payments system, and the African Trade Observatory. Challenges 
in the implementation of any of the instruments can affect the utilization of the 
tariff and general trade provisions under the AfCFTA. For example, complex 
criteria used to determine the national source of a product and how the source of 
intermediate products used in production are treated have impacted the extent 
to which firms on the continent will pursue and will be involved in the AfCFTA 
agenda. Therefore, procedures for the issuance of certificates of origin must follow 
smooth and efficient processes, at the same time minimize the risk of re-exports. 
Improved ICT infrastructure on the continent is imperative therefore for the 
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effective functioning of the online negotiation forum, obtaining online certificates 
of origin, the digital payments system, and the African Trade Observatory.
The broader institutional framework for the implementation, administration, 
facilitation, monitoring, and evaluation of the AfCFTA consists of the Assembly, 
the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Senior Trade Officials; and the 
Secretariat. For the latter, Ghana was selected to host the AfCFTA Secretariat and 
the Secretariat’s key role as stated in the agreement, is to provide administrative 
support for the implementation of the AfCFTA Agreement, such as convening 
meetings, monitoring and evaluating the implementation process, and other duties 
assigned to it by the Committee of Senior Officials, Council of Ministers, and the 
AU Assembly.
The AfCFTA is also accompanied by other continental initiatives such as the pro-
tocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right to Residence and Right to Establishment, 
and the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM) [18]. In a nutshell, the 
AfCFTA arrangement is expected to create the biggest free trade area in the world, 
based on the number of nations that have signed and ratified the agreement. The 
settlement therefore will join 1.3 billion individuals across 55 nations, with a consoli-
dated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) esteemed at US$3.4 trillion.
The expectation for this agreement is quite huge. It is expected that approxi-
mately 30 million individuals will be lifted out of poverty. Accordingly, it is 
expected that over-all from the agreement, the agreement will bring about $16.1 bil-
lion in welfare gains [19]. It is also argued that the full accomplishment of AfCFTA 
would reshape markets and economies across the region and increase services, 
manufacturing, and natural resources sectors, and subsequently increase the real 
income gains by 7 percent or approximately US$450 billion.1
3. Pre COVID-19 trade
Putting the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the AfCFTA and trade volumes 
into perspective, it is important to first highlight the state of trade within Africa 
prior to the coming into effect of the AfCFTA. In 2016, prior to the signing of the 
AfCFTA, the total intra-African exports amounted to USD 62.2 billion. Earlier 
data from 2000 to 2010 shows relatively very low values of intra-African trade (see 
Figure 1). Over the period, intra-African imports represented an average of 14.2 
percent of total African imports, while intra-African exports represent 10.4 percent 
of total African exports. Altogether, over the period 2000 to 2010, intra-African 
imports amounted to USD 29 billion whereas, intra-African exports amounted to 
USD 30 billion [20].
Overall, intra-African trade data have shown low levels of regional trade on the 
African continent prior to AfCFTA and the pandemic (see Figure 2). Total exports, 
for example from the Northern African region to other countries in the northern 
region, amounted to 5% in 2011, whereas exports from the Northern African 
region to the other individual regions on the continent amounted to 1% or less of 
total exports [16, 21]. Total export within a region is highest for exports within the 
Eastern bloc (EAC), where total exports from the Eastern Africa African region to 
other countries in the east amounted to 15% in 2011. For the other regions, exports 
within a bloc are less than 10%. For example, total exports from the Southern 
African region to other countries in the south, and that from Western Africa to 
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Figure 2, prominent inter-bloc trade took place between the east and south (EAC-
SADC), and west and south (ECOWAS-SADC), which accounted for 4% of total 
exports in both cases.
Table 1 below highlights some major bilateral intra-African exports on the 
continent prior to the signing of the AfCFTA agreement in 2017.
Table 1 indicates that the largest single value of bilateral trade took place 
between Nigeria and South Africa, followed by Ghana and South Africa. Overall, 
the share of intra-African exports as a percentage of the continent’s total exports 
stood at 16.6% in 2017 [22]. From the data, the top five (5) intra-African exporters 
are South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, and Algeria. The expected benefits from 
the AfCFTA will to a large extent depend on the country’s pre- AfCFTA bilateral 
intra-African trade volumes. Countries with a lower share of pre- AfCFTA intra-
African trade will benefit significantly from this agreement.
Figure 2. 
Inter-African trade within blocs 2011. Source: Jordaan [16].
Figure 1. 
Intra-African trade from 2000 to 2010 (billions of US dollars). Source: Statistics division, AUC.
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Data from West Africa is quite interesting in terms of highlighting the composi-
tion of intra-African trade. Von Uexkull [5] noted that for some countries the share 
of manufactured good is substantially higher among other ECOWAS countries 
than exports to global markets. For example, Benin exports manufactured food, 
beverages and Tobacco and some construction materials (steel and cement) to the 
ECOWAS countries while for the rest of the world their main export is cotton. Cote 
d’Ivoire exports mainly refined petroleum products to ECOWAS and cocoa/cocoa 
butter to the rest of the world. For Ghana, the country exports manufactured 
wood, plastic and textiles to ECOWAS, semi-processed gold to South Africa and 
mainly cocoa to the rest of the world. Togo, the country with the highest share 
of intra-ECOWAS trade (59%) exports steel, cement, packaging materials and 
food products (margarine, flour, mineral water) to ECOWAS and cocoa/mining 
phosphates to the rest of the world (see [5] for a detailed breakdown of intra-
ECOWAS trade).
Trends in the share of total merchandised export of the top five (5) countries 
in Africa’s export (see Figure 3) prior to the pandemic provides evidence on 
the potential of AfCFTA in improving total trade volumes for countries with 
traditionally small levels of export. The data as presented in Figure 2 shows 
that, from the 1980s, except Angola and Morocco that has experienced marginal 
increases in their African export shares, large countries such as South Africa, 
Nigeria, and Algeria has seen a decline in their share of Africa’s export. One 
would expect that the structures instituted under the AfCFTA will empower 
not only the traditionally large export countries in Africa but also help empower 
small countries with low trade potentials and limited pre- AfCFTA export 
volumes to expand export.
In addition, data collected prior to the agreement and outbreak of the 
COVID-19 pandemic showed that the majority of enterprises in Africa consid-
ered customs and trade regulations as a major constraint to trade. Precisely, 
Stuart [24] found that the percentage of African enterprises identifying customs 
and trade regulations as a major constraint is almost 40% higher in Africa than 
in the rest of the world. The AfCFTA aims to eliminate import duties and reduce 
non-tariff barriers significantly. Thus, improving trade procedures through 
enhanced trade facilitation should reduce bottlenecks associated with intra-
African trade.
Exporter Importer Value (USD ‘000) % of total intra-African exports
Nigeria South Africa 1,892,285 3.0%
Ghana South Africa 1,362,906 2.2%
Angola South Africa 982,401 1.6%
South Africa Dem Rep. of the Congo 782,502 1.3%
South Africa Angola 562,933 0.9%
South Africa Kenya 556,610 0.9%
Algeria Morocco 499,056 0.8%
Mali South Africa 474,239 0.8%
Nigeria Cameroon 467,079 0.8%
Egypt Algeria 464,406 0.7%
Source: TWN, [15].
Table 1. 
Major bilateral export relationships.
7
The COVID-19 Pandemic and African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Exploring…
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97394
We argue that despite the enormous potential in using intra-regional trade to 
help reduce poverty and food insecurity in some part of Africa, the strength of 
these linkages both in the short and long-term will depend on the direct effect of 
the COVID-19 pandemic on the implementation of the trade agreement, and on the 
institutional structures that are in nascent stages.
4. COVID-19 impacts
Mold and Mveyange [25] found a large increment in the volume of Kenya’s total 
export in the first quarter of 2020 (prior to the outbreak of the pandemic in Africa), 
attributed partly to intra-African trade that was beginning to intensify due to the 
enhanced effort under the AfCFTA framework. There is however now increasing 
fear and hesitation around the world due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which has led 
to a new set of behaviors [26]. For Africa, about 0.5 percent of the population is 
confirmed to have contracted COVID-19 COVID-19 [27]. The financial interdepen-
dency and multilateral regulations that globalization stressed some decades ago, 
are now facing daunting and unsettling threats. As the pandemic and its impacts 
continue to extend deep, with both health and economic consequences taking a toll 
on most developing countries, trade has not been spared. Thus, although the AfCFTA 
addresses several tariff and non-tariff barriers, the COVID-19 pandemic has the 
potential to erode the potential benefits of this agreement. We explore the effect of the 
pandemic on the AfCFTA agreement, consumption, production, and market-based 
labor activities, with implications for volumes of trade in the middle of a pandemic.
4.1 Impact on the AfCFTA agreement
The Covid-19 pandemic could erode the expected benefits of the AfCFTA 
agreement.2 The global spread of the pandemic has strong implications for trade 
and mobility [28]. This is the first direct effect the COVID-19 pandemic have 
had on the implementation of the AfCFTA agreement itself. The fulfillment of 
AfCFTA was deferred due to the pandemic, hence the AfCFTA agreement which 
was planned to start on 1st of July, 2020 was postponed to 1st January, 2021 [29]. 
2 The Coronavirus Virus (COVID-19), first discovered in Wuhan City of China in December 2019. It has 
now spread over the globe.
Figure 3. 
Share (%) of top five countries in Africa exports. Source: Verter [23].
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COVID-19 management systems instituted by countries at a time the AfCFTA was 
in its critical phase of implementation have directly impacted intra-African trade. 
These measures have included travel bans, border closures, mandatory quarantine, 
partial lockdowns, and total local lockdowns. Negotiation of key aspects of the 
agreements such as Rule of Origin and Schedules of Tariff Concession stalled due to 
the outbreak of COVID-19, as some of these aspects of the agreement require physi-
cal contacts to achieve full operationalization of the agreement. In all, the pandemic 
caused a six-month delay of the AfCFTA agreement.
At the administrative level, the pandemic has affected the organization of the 
second biennial Intra African Trade Fair (IATF) which was slated for 2020 but 
delayed until somewhere in 2021. The fair was to provide a platform for stakehold-
ers to share trade, investment, and market information aimed at supporting intra-
African trade and African economic integration [29].
4.2 Impact on consumption, production, and market-based labor activities
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to instabilities in Africa’s supply chains, 
notwithstanding tumbling oil costs and a lessened worldwide interest for African 
non-oil products. Thus, despite the fall in oil prices, weak African and global demand 
precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic has affected production on the continent. A 
decrease in intra-African and global exports from Africa have affected revenues and 
growth across countries in Africa. It is projected that Africa may lose half of its GDP 
with growth falling from 3.2 percent to about 2 percent due to the disruption of global 
supply chains (Africa [30]). As observed by Sachs and Malaney [31] large-scale viral 
diseases can have a significant long-term impact on GDP and per-capita income.
The fall in oil price has also directly placed excessive economic and monetary 
risk on countries like Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Nigeria, and other importing African countries. In addition, China where the virus 
was first discovered, is the biggest trading investor of many countries in Africa 
prior to the spread of the virus [32]. The U.S Energy Information Administration 
also projects that the United States will likely take years to return to 2019 levels of 
energy consumption.3 All these developments will affect the GDP and employment 
in many of the oil-producing countries in Africa.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) suggested that the 
COVID-19 crises could result in huge unemployment in Africa, where unemploy-
ment was already a major problem prior to the pandemic [33]. The pandemic also 
affected the nature of work, with many workers working fewer hours post lock-
down, to minimize exposure to the virus. The closing down of mines and factories, 
changes in nature of work, and shortages of imported inputs due to the lockdown 
measures imposed by many African countries, have affected production, export, 
earnings, and wellbeing in Africa in the next couple of years.
Aside from production, at the micro-level, Durizzo et al. [34] have shown that 
the pandemic negatively affected household consumption and welfare in Ghana 
and South Africa. Similar evidence of reduced consumption is also found for many 
of the major countries that Africa trades with. For example, Chen et al. [35] have 
found long-term impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on consumption using high-
frequency transaction data.
Data from the European Union shows a 17.3% year-on-year decline in household 
final consumption expenditure.4 Lower levels of consumption within Africa on 
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for African goods. All these changes in consumption have led to reduced demand 
for African products, and as such led to a significant reduction in production and 
employment. Data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) suggests that 
approximately 1.6 billion informal economy workers and 436 million enterprises 
were significantly impacted by the pandemic and the lockdown measures, with 
many of the affected being women-owned and managed firms, and firms managed 
by persons with disabilities (PWDs).5 It is therefore important to put in policies 
to limit income loss for both formal and informal sector employees, in order to 
minimize poverty and vulnerability on the African continent.
Industrial production in Africa is not spared. The pandemic has slowed demand 
for Africa’s agricultural export products, and therefore putting the jobs and 
livelihoods of many households at risk. It has also disrupted the supply chain for 
agricultural inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizers, crop protection products, 
equipment, etc., from neighboring countries. Poor infrastructure and the high 
cost of doing business were already challenging intra-African trade prior to the 
pandemic. The pandemic has exacerbated the problem and has created challenges 
on both the supply and demand-side. Overall, industrial production in Africa 
is estimated to have decreased by 1.2% due to COVID-19 induced factory shut-
downs. Similar reductions in production are recorded for Africa’s trading partners. 
Production losses in Africa will continue to increase if infection rates continue to 
increase and factory shutdowns are reinstated to curb the spread of the pandemic.
Remittances, an important income source of household income for household 
production and consumption have been affected significantly by the pandemic. Thus, 
the pandemic has led to reduced mobility, increased restrictions, affecting FDI flows, 
tightening the domestic financial market, and leading to heightened unemployment.
In a nutshell, disruption in supply chains for production inputs, falling demand 
for Africa’s production, near collapse of tourism and hospitality sectors, reduced 
remittances, high fiscal deficits, and the observed depreciation of local currencies 
have heightened existing household vulnerabilities. The region remains vulnerable 
to health shocks due to the undeveloped health systems in many African countries. 
Vaccine rollout as of February 2021 had been very slow across the continent, even 
though infection and death rates are rising. Failure to address these long and short-
term challenges can affect production and slow trade for many African countries.
4.3 COVID-19, gender and trade
Examining the effect of the pandemic through a gender lens will help to tailor 
trade support for women involved in the intra-African trade. Experience from 
the Ebola virus showed that quarantines significantly reduce livelihood activi-
ties, and exacerbating poverty rates among women. Women are predominantly 
involved in the small cross-border trading in Africa. Many of the measures 
instituted by African countries to curb the spread of the pandemic, such as the 
mandatory quarantines at the borders, national-level lockdowns, and limitation 
on mobility have all impacted the trade activities of women involved in cross 
border trading. The COVID-19 impacts are felt especially by women who gener-
ally outnumber men in the informal trade sector, and across many countries are 
earning less. Thus, women traders, compared to men, who have low savings and 
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It is crucial for policymakers in Africa to consider cross-border traders as essen-
tial staff requiring priority in any pandemic vaccination rollout. Continued engage-
ment with informal trade associations along the land borders of Africa is imperative 
to sustain intra-African trade in the middle of a pandemic. Training of women 
involved in cross-border trading on the digital tools needed for the key aspects of 
the agreements such as the rule of origin, schedules of tariff concession, and digital 
payments system are critical to limited exposure to the COVID-19 virus.
In a nutshell, females’ involvement in intra-African trade is crucial for the overall 
AfCFTA agenda, and therefore there is the need for targeted support for women 
involved the cross-border trading with the African continents. Support can take the 
form of stimulus packages, early vaccination, free COVID-19 tests, and education 
on the virus to curb the spread of the virus among this group and at the same time 
sustain intra-African trade.
4.4 Opportunities in the middle of a pandemic
The pandemic does not only present negative effects but also provides the African 
continent and the AfCFTA agreement the chance to explore new ways of engage-
ments, new markets, new products, and the opportunity and time to devise ways to 
mitigate the effect of the pandemic on trade and welfare. Thus, despite the short-term 
poor outlook, the pandemic has presented some opportunities that could translate 
into long-term increased opportunities for industry growth and employment.
The pandemic and the associated restriction on mobility has also presented 
an opportunity for African countries to reinforce local production and intensify 
import substitution of many products and the heightened need to the intra-African 
supply chains in order to better deal with any future pandemics. For example, in 
terms of pharmaceuticals, Africa spends quite a lot to import drugs from Europe 
and Asia, regions that have experienced huge disruptions in their supply chains. 
African countries with the capacity for the production of pharmaceuticals can be 
supported under the umbrella of AfCFTA to increase inter-regional trade of phar-
maceuticals, for mutual intra-African economic benefits. With Africa plagued with 
many diseases, local production of all forms of pharmaceuticals will help to create 
sustainable long-term jobs and improve wellbeing.
Intra-African trade can be leveraged to deal with persistent and COVID-19 
induced food insecurity. With a number of African countries being net exporters 
of food and with many others importing food from Europe and Asia, the pandemic 
provides the opportunity for strengthening food value chains and infrastructure 
under the AfCFTA. Thus, food can easily be moved from countries that have food 
surpluses to those that have food deficits if under AfCFTA transportation networks 
in Africa are improved.
In addition, despite the disruption of the international supply chain and delays in 
export/import channels, some companies particularly in the telecommunication sec-
tor have reported positive growth in revenues. AfCFTA can also leverage the improved 
internet connectivity on the African continent to enhance trade negotiation and drive-
up volumes of trade transactions within Africa. Thus, as the world struggles to deal 
with both the health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and forestall 
trade, it can be said that the AfCFTA agreement is coming in at the right time.
5. Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic has imposed nontrivial cost on all economic agents, 
with implications expected to last for a while. While the pandemic has had 
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consequences for trade and mobility, it has highlighted the need for strengthen-
ing value chains in general, and intra-African trade structures to be specific, in 
order to position Africa to better deal with any unforeseen future pandemic. This 
chapter explored the current and potential impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement, highlighting 
the effects on the trade agreement itself, trade volumes – driven by the pandemic 
induced-changes in consumption, production and labour markets –, and women 
on the intra-African trade corridors. The chapter also highlights the opportunities 
that African countries can take advantage of even in the middle of the pandemic. 
Thus, the chapter ends on the not that while Africa deals with the crisis, it must use 
the opportunity to strengthen African institutions, to improve trade far beyond the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
Abbreviation
AfDB African Development Bank
AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Area
AMU Arab Maghreb Union
AU African Union
AUC African Union Commission
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States
COVID Coronavirus Disease
COMESA Common Market for Eastern Southern Africa
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC East African Community
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross domestic product
IATF Intra African Trade Fair
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO International Labour Organization
PWDs Persons with disabilities
REC’s Regional Economic Communities
SAATM Single African Air Transport Market
SADC Southern African Development Community
SARS. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
TFTA Tripartite Free Trade Area
UMA Arab Maghreb Union
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
WHO World Health Organization
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